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Statement of the Basic Question
We must think of our whole economics in terms of a
preventive pathology instead of a curative pathology.
Don't oppose forces; use them. God is a verb, not a noun.
Buckminster Fuller's proverbial observation in "No More
Secondhand God" is one of the more recent pronouncements of a basic
tenet which has been repeated often in the development of civilization.
The underlying notion is the foundation for such diverse current
concepts as "preventive medicine," "preventive detention," or even
"preventive war." This often vague, and ill defined, belief appears
to generally state that there exist circumstances under which short-run
sacrifice can contribute to long-run benefit. Older statements of this
philosophy are many and include: "An ounce of prevention is worth a
2
pound of cure," or "A stitch in time saves nine." In American
3
literature, Benjamin Franklin s legacy of maxims has given us:
"Want of care does us more damage than want of knowledge," and
Richard Buckminster Fuller, "No More Secondhand God" quoted in
John Bartlett, Familiar Quotations (14th ed. ; Boston: Little, Brown




Benjamin Franklin, The Way to Wealth , in The Annals of America ,
Vol. 2 (Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., 1968), p. 32.

A little neglect may breed great mischief; for want of a
nail the shoe was lost, and for want of a shoe the horse
was lost, and for want of a horse the rider was lost,
being overtaken and slain by the enemy; all for the want
of a little care about a horseshoe nail.
This last quotation, which Franklin apparently borrowed from
4
the earlier work of George Herbert, suggests military aspects of
the preventive philosophy. Historians have similarly noted a
correlation between military or naval success and attention to
preventive measures adopted long before the battle. Observations
have included references to the preventive care and attention given
to military material in anticipation of future benefit.
Mahan's assessment of the naval confrontations between the
British and French fleets in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries
includes frequent reference to superior Brttish attention to such
preventive measures. As Mahan notes, British commanders were often
able to avoid or delay engagement with French units because their
ships' bottoms were periodically "coppered" or sheathed to protect
against worming deterioration. They were thus able to out-distance
French ships that, although newer and often of superior designed
speed, had not been protected against the material degradation of
long months at sea.
The practice of "coppering" is no longer a significant
preventive measure among major navies. Steel, mechanically propelled
4George Herbert, Jacula Prudentum
,
quoted in John Bartlett,
Familiar Quotations (14th ed. ; Boston: Little, Brown and Company,
1968), pp. 324-25.
Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power upon History
1660-1783 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1957), pp. 371-451.

warships have replaced the wooden sailing ships in the last hundred
years. The desirability of improving the future performance of naval
material through the application of preventive policies and techniques
has, however, persisted and widened in scope.
The United States Navy has given increasing attention to the
identification of material problems which can be minimized through
the application of maintenance policies designed to monitor, inspect,
and service shipboard equipment before failures occur. Its efforts
toward this end have been directed in two major areas: first, the
proper design, procurement, and installation of equipment which
considers the total maintenance function (preventive and corrective)
which will be required; and second, the establishment of a standardized
maintenance and material management system for operational ships.
This latter effort has resulted in the Navy Shipboard Maintenance
and Material Management (3-M) System.
Ackoff and Sasieni have defined the nature of Operations
Research to be: "The application of scientific method by inter-
disciplinary teams to problems involving the control of organized
(man-machine) systems so as to provide solutions which best serve the
purposes of the organizations as a whole." Among the basic "prototype"
problems which these authors have described as most frequently
recurring in Operations Research is that of Replacement. They further
sub-classify the area of Replacement as including those problems
involving "the selection of a preventive maintenance scheme, which
is designed to reduce the probability of failure."
Russell L. Ackoff and Maurice W. Sasieni, Fundamentals of
Operations Research (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1968),
pp. 6-15.

There exists today a considerable body of literature in the
area of preventive maintenance theory developed by Operations Research
(or Management Science) . These theories generally involve the modeling
of a policy of preventive maintenance to determine the optimum decision
for meeting objective criteria.
The purpose of this present research is to determine the degree
of usefulness of existing preventive maintenance models to aid in the
design and operation of the Navy shipboard 3-M System. The analysis
will require a survey of both the theoretical literature and the 3-M
system objectives and procedures.
Scope of the Research
This research will investigate only the shipboard 3-M system;
it will not study related systems in aviation, nuclear propulsion,
or special weapons activities of the Navy. Further, it is intended
to limit the investigation of system objectives and procedures to those
directed from the Department of the Navy level. No attempt to study
the policies and practices of subordinate commands in the operating
forces is to be made. The source of the bulk of 3-M information will
be obtained from personnel and publications of the Office of the Chief
of Naval Operations (OPNAV) . Finally, in an effort to limit the
scope of inquiry to a relatively narrow portion of the data available,
the investigation of technical direction and procedures will be
conducted only for that equipment managed by the Naval Ship Systems
Command (NavShips) . NavShips is but one of many technical Systems
Commands which are coordinated by the Chief of Naval Material for
managerial control including coordination and standardization of 3-M
operation.

Desired Value to be Obtained from the Study
The application of techniques of Operations Research in the
Department of Defense has been the subject of considerable investi-„
gation and literature over the past two decades. In the more limited
spectrum of professional literature on naval shipboard operation and
management, the 3-M System has also received much attention. 3-M has
been evaluated as an application of industrial engineering, management
engineering, and management informations systems. This author believes
that there may be beneficial congruence between certain theories of
Operations Research problem-solving and the problem-solving apparatus
of the 3-M System. It is hoped that an investigation of each will
reveal such similarities, dissimilarities, current connection, and
potential inter-relationships as may exist. Preliminary research
suggested the possibility of correlation between the two topics
which this paper will attempt to document and analyze.
Research Methodology
Data has been obtained for this paper through the use of
library research and direct interviews. Reference material has
been obtained from public, educational, and military libraries in
the metropolitan Washington, D.C. area. Particularly valuable
assistance has been obtained at the U.S. Army Pentagon Library.
Interviews have been conducted at the Office of the Chief of Naval
Operations, the Naval Ship Systems Command Headquarters, and the
Naval Ship Engineering Center.

Terminology
An attempt has been made to permit this paper to be
understandable to a reader who has neither a background in the
field of Operations Research nor a knowledge of the operation of
the shipboard 3-M System. Nonetheless, some compromise had to be
achieved to avoid the necessity of identifying and defining every
technical or institutional term necessary to the research presenta-
tion. In the case of military terminology, reference has been made
to the Joint Chiefs of Staff Dictionary of U.S. Military Terms for
Joint Usage . Acronyms are utilized in this paper but only after
their parenthetical introduction following a full title, name, or
concept to which they apply.
Organization of the Thesis
Chapter II introduces the notion of preventive maintenance,
describes the evolution of Operations Research interest and inquiry
into this field, and selectively describes significant theories,
policies, and models developed. It also provides a general overview
of the nature of equipment failure and the statistical techniques
and probabilistic distributions used to describe such behavior.
Chapter III provides background information on the original development
of the shipboard 3-M System. It then briefly describes the major
elements of the System, defining the objectives and basic procedures
of each. Lastly it investigates the extent of system integration in
the 3-M approach and hypothesizes a possible application of quantitative
techniques of Operations Research to improve the degree of integration.
Chapter IV attempts to reconcile the research presented on the

theoretical aspects of preventive maintenance with that observed for
the actual maintenance system. It introduces the problem of objective
criteria and discusses the concept of material readiness. Finally,
it offers specific recommendations on the application of Operations
Research models to the existing 3-M System and recommendations on
how increased model utilization could be obtained with system
refinement. Chapter V briefly summarizes the major conclusions
which the author has drawn from the research process. It concludes





In a traditional discourse on preventive maintenace which
encompasses no quantitative techniques, Carl Wyder has defined any
"PM program" to consist of two basic activities:
1. Periodic inspection of plant assets and equipment to
uncover conditions leading to production breakdowns
or harmful depreciation.
2. Upkeep of plant to sterilize such conditions, or
to adjust or repair such conditions while they are
still in a minor stage.
1
The explicit objectives of this industrial definition appear to
focus on two distinct criteria which will remain important throughout
the discussion of this paper:
1. Preventive maintenance can attempt to minimize the
probability that the normal operation of an activity
or enterprise is interrupted. In other words it is
intended to minimize "downtime"; maximize "uptime."
Or, in military terminology, the objective may be
stated to maximize readiness (which might loosely be
thought of as the "normal operation" of a military
activity)
.
Carl G. Wyder, "Preventive Maintenance," in Maintenance
Engineering Handbook
,
ed. by L. C. Morrow (New York: McGraw-Hill
Book Company, 1957), p. 1-92.

2. Preventive maintenance can, alternatively, attempt
to minimize the expected costs per period of an
operation. If this latter criteria is adopted, it
is then necessary that the nature of such "costs"
be clearly specified.
The principal difference highlighted by the above distinction is that
of emphasis on either the inputs or the outputs of an activity.
Newer managerial control techniques might suggest a synthesis of
these alternative criteria into a single measure of efficiency or
effectiveness which would examine both inputs and outputs. Such a
measure might involve cost-benefit or cost-effectiveness analysis
and will be developed later.
The history of Operations Research inquiry into the area of
preventive maintenance can be traced back approximately twenty years.
Early dissertations, however, for the most part involved the deter-
mination of optimum means of "planned replacement." This is not
surprising, since an attempt to classify preventive maintenance
theory within the broad major investigative areas of Operations
Research would probably classify it as a subsidiary element of
general Replacement Theory. Further, a more comprehensive view of
this entire field would better 'describe the total investigative
discipline as that of Renewal Theory (whether the renewal consists
of replacement or repair—maintenance)
.
In 1941, Mr. N. R. Campbell of the General Electric Company
of England utilized a complicated set of integral equations to
determine the most economic policy involving the mass replacement
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of lightbulbs. His techniques probably represent the first
application of the methodology of the emerging discipline of
Operations Research in the area of preventive maintenance. The
military activities of the following years produced a rapid
expansion of this type of research with considerable emphasis in
the United States on the study of equipment reliability theory
—
2
an area closely allied to the subject of renewal.
In 1949, George Terborgh made a significant contribution
to the general field of Renewal Theory with his pioneering work,
Dynamic Equipment Policy . Terborgh' s examination of the nature of
"Primary" and "Secondary" Replacement, the functional degradation
of equipment, and his two basic concepts—Operating Inferiority
and the Adverse Minimum—all greatly expanded the scope of investi-
gations into industrial equipment replacement. He was, however,
primarily concerned with replacement policy as it affects the
capital budgeting decisions of the manager. He did not stress the
nature of failure in service or its costs , and his analytical tech-
niques are not readily adaptable for maintenance application. His
discussion of the gradual change of state generally described as
obsolescence and the opportunity costs inherent in a full treatment
of replacement questions have provided later researchers in preventive
3
maintenance with a significant base of theory.
M. Kammins and J. J. McCall, Rules for Planned Replacement
of Aircraft and Missile Parts , Rand Memorandum 2810-PR (Santa Monica,
California: The Rand Corporation, 1961), p. iii.
3George Terborgh, Dynamic Equipment Policy (New York: McGraw-
Hill Book Company, 1949), pp. 1-91.
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The first explicitly definable investigation of general
preventive maintenance /replacement by members of the emerging
Operations Research discipline can probably be located at the Rand
Corporation in early contract work for the Air Force. In 1952,
A. A. Alchian prepared a report, Economic Replacement Policy , which
demonstrated the first deterministic solution to the cost minimiza-
4
tion problem involved in the replacement of deteriorating equipment.
This early endeavor provided a solid foundation upon which a con-
tinuing pursuit of improved techniques and means of application have
been developed by others. The extension of early replacement theory
into more general renewal theory initiated some research into the
problems of optimum maintenance policies for equipment
—
particularly
where that equipment is known, or thought, to exhibit stochastic
failure characteristics.
Other centers of research contributed to the present body of
literature in the preventive maintenance area. The commercial
airlines were quick to appreciate the applicability of the mathe-
matical procedures developed at the Rand Corporation and made early
use of mathematically derived maintenance programs constrained, of
course, by the high degree of governmental regulation on maintenance
standards for aircraft. Still other researchers, particularly
Barlow, Hunter, and Proschan at Sylvania, developed mathematical
theories to define and quantify reliability. Newer mathematical
tools, particularly the technique of dynamic programming, provided
4
John J. McCall, "Maintenance Policies for Stochastically
Failing Equipment: A Survey," Management Science , Vol. 11, No. 5
(March, 1965), pp. 493-502.

12
new avenues of effective application of preventive maintenance
concepts. Throughout this developmental period, 1952-1962, the
increasing accessibility and capabilities of electronic computers
were providing a realistic means of demonstrating the working
application of the mathematical models that had been constructed.
Among the most prolific writers in recent years has been
John J. McCall. McCall is a Professor of Management Science at
the University of Chicago and was formerly a research economist
for the Rand Corporation. Much of McCall 's published work at the
Rand Corporation (1959-1966) concerned the development of procedural
rules for the planned replacement of military weapons systems,
descriptions of "opportunistic" replacement ind inspection policies,
and associated support and supply systems. In more reeent years,
he has made an additional contribution through articles which have
surveyed the field to categorize the various maintenance policies
which he and other researchers have developed. In a 1965 article
in Management Science
, he describes the general classification of
maintenance policies for stochastically failing equipment. This
classification can be briefly outlined as
:
I. Maintenance Policies for Known Distributions of
Times to Failure
A. Preventive Maintenance Policies
1. Periodic Preventive Maintenance Policies
2. Sequential Preventive Maintenance Policies
3. Preventive Maintenance Policies for Equipment
with Several Parts
Kammins and McCall, Rules for Planned Replacement
, pp. 1-3.
McCall, "Maintenance Policies: A Survey," pp. 493-512.
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B. Preparedness Maintenance Policies
1. Periodic Preparedness Policies
2. Sequential Preparedness Policies
3. Preparedness Policies for Equipment
with Several Parts
4. Multi-state Preparedness Policies
II. Maintenance Policies for Unknown Distributions of
Times to Failure
A. Minimax Maintenance Policies
1. Preventive Maintenance Policies
2. Preparedness Policies
B. Policies Selected by Bounding Techniques
1. Preventive Maintenance Policies
2. Preparedness Policies
C. Adaptive Maintenance (Preparedness) Policies
In a later discussion (1967) in the book, Defense Management
,
McCall more briefly describes the above classification as an incomplete
summary of the research in stochastic maintenance policies . He notes
that two other broad areas of investigation can be similarly categorized
and discussed—Deterministic Maintenance Policies and investigation
into the relationship between Maintainability and Reliability. It
is not within the scope of this present work to investigate these
latter two areas. Indeed, we cannot even attempt to fully survey the
research limited to stochastic maintenance policies but must concentrate
on a limited number of specific models.
Before leaving this brief survey of research and investigation
into maintenance theory, it may be valuable to note that much of the
literature must be located through inquiry into adjacent fields of
John J. McCall, "Maintenance," in Defense Management
,
ed. by




Operations Research. Maintenance models have been explored by
research in such fields as queueing theory, computer simulation,
and inventory theory. Indeed, the interdependent relationship
between inventory and replacement models has been an area of
special attention for separate study. Thus, while we stated
earlier that Preventive Maintenance Theory can generally be thought
of as a subsidiary area to Replacement (Renewal) Theory, it may now
be apparent that no neat general categorization is available.
Fortunately, the bulk of our subsequent theoretical investigation
can be directed to a few general stochastic models which, on the
basis of their stated assumptions, appear to offer potential appli-
cability to the Navy's Maintenance and Material Management (3-M)
System.
Periodic Cost Minimization Model
The basic preventive maintenance model which has received
the most extensive attention is the periodic model to minimize
total maintenance costs per unit time. It rests upon two basic
assumptions (or qualifications) for a piece of equipment:
a. The equipment should exhibit a strictly increasing
tendency to fail with age.
b. The after-failure cost of maintenance (corrective)
is greater than the before-failure cost of
maintenance (preventive)
.
The first qualification allows us to begin the model by describing
a continuous probability density function for failure of the
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equipment as y = f(t). The second qualification allows us to
define the before-failure costs (per maintenance action) as B,
the after-failure costs as A, and to require that A > B.
Given this base of data, it is then possible to compute the
useful values which will allow determination of an optimal preventive
maintenance policy. These include, but are not limited to:
u = average life before failure without preventive
maintenance
x = average life before failure with preventive maintenance
C = expected maintenance costs per unit time period when
preventive maintenance period T is expressed in
the given unit time.
T = preventive maintenance period such that — = periodicity
p = F(t) ; cumulative probability of failure
q = [l-F(t)] = 1-p ; cumulative probability of survival.
Using this nomenclature it can then be shown that:









x = tf (t)dt + T f(t)dt .
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From (1) and (2) , it can further be demonstrated that the Costs
per unit time for a P.M. program at time T is expressed as
T oo
(3) C = f(t)dt + B f(t)dt
Further, p = / f(t)dt, and q = 1-p = f f(t)dt. Substi-
T






Finally, by taking — and setting it equal to zero, we can
determine a minimum value for C (the second derivative can be




















simpler solution by iteration when the possible values
constrained to weeks, months, years, etc. (as in the
system), we can utilize Pt in place of f(t) where
cumulative probability of failure to time t less the
probability of failure to time t-1. Or










above equation, as shown by Richmond, lends itself easily
solution and is certainly easily adaptable to computer
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solution involving a very simple program. 8
Although equations (5) and (6) appear clear, they are
9





jd) U-pt)dt-pT - ^
or







illustrating the equivalence of the equations.
Equation (7) introduced the value j (t) which can be defined
as the conditional probability of failure for the interval t to
t + 1 given that the item has survived to time t. As shown above,
it is equal to the prior probability that an item will fail in the
interval t to t + 1, f(t), divided by the complement of the prior
cumulative probability that the item will have failed by time t,
[l-F(t)], which can also be described as the cumulative probability
of survival to time t.
Samuel B. Richmond, Operations Research for Management
Decisions (New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1968), pp. 251-257,
9






Barlow and Hunter have done research into optimum
preventive maintenance policies which may be best described as
"preparedness" models. They have described their conclusions
regarding two distinct possible policies as:
one which is useful in maintaining simple equipment and
another which is useful in maintaining large, complex
systems. For less complex equipment, repair at time
of failure (or replacement) may actually correspond to
general overhaul. . . . However, for more complex
systems such as computers, preventive maintenance is
commonly scheduled after a certain number of operating
hours have accumulated. Between maintenance periods,
failures are repaired as quickly as possible.
They define an optimal policy as that which will maximize
their "limiting efficiency"—the fractional amount of up-time over
long intervals. This criterion can be formally defined as an
efficienty (EFF) such that:
1. EFF„ = expected fractional amount of time system
is on during [0,T]
2. EFF^ = lin^^EFF —the "limiting efficiency" used
for policy evaluation.
The two policies which are then evaluated utilizing this
criterion can be described as:
Policy I
Perform preventive maintenance after t hours of continuing
operation without failure. t is allowed to be infinite; if system
failure occurs prior to t , emergency maintenance is performed at
Richard Barlow and Larry Hunter, "Optimum Preventive Main-
tenance Policies," The Journal of the Operations Research Society of
America , Vol. 8, No. 1 (January-February, 1960), p. 90.
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time of failure and preventive maintenance is rescheduled. The
assumption is made that the system is as good as new after either
emergency or scheduled maintenance (or replacement) is performed.
Policy II
Perform preventive maintenance on the system after it has
been operating a total of t* hours regardless of the number of
intervening failures. t* is allowed to be infinite. If the
system fails before t*, only interim, minimum maintenance is
performed. The assumption is made that the system is as good as
new after scheduled preventive maintenance and that the system
failure rate is not disturbed by performing minimim repairs.
Using much of the nomenclature developed for the periodic
cost minimization model, we recall that for a failure distribution
F(t), with density (first derivative) f(t), the proneness of
system failure at time t can be expressed as:
j(t) = -aa-
U-F(t)] '
and that for cases where j (t) is an increasing function of t,
preventive maintenance appears plausible. As before, u = expected
time to failure without preventive maintenance. For our new models,
we add the quantities
:
t Type I Preventive Maintenance Period
o Jtr
t* = Type II Preventive Maintenance Period
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T = Expected time to perform scheduled maintenance
(equivalent to the B or Before situation in
the cost minimization model) . Policy I or II
T = Expected time to perform emergency maintenance
(equivalent to the A or After situation in
the cost minimization model) . Policy I
T = Expected time to perform minimum maintenance.
Policy II.
As reported by Barlow and Hunter, an optimum Type I policy






) = y^T When Te >Ts
e s
with a limiting efficiency:
EFF
«> 1 + (T -T )j(t ) '
e s o
When T £ T , the optimum policy is no preventive maintenance,
i.e., t = °° with a limiting efficiency:
EFF
oo u + T
e
In a similar fashion, they illustrate a proof using general
renewal theory that an optimum Type II policy is given by a value








with a limiting efficiency expressed as:
EFF [1+T
m j(t*)]
For any given time to perform scheduled maintenance (T
s )
,
the selection between Types I and II policies involves an examination
of the corresponding values of emergency and minimum maintenance
actions (T and Tm ) for the system. We can graphically display
an example indicating the selection boundary between the two policies
where their limiting efficiencies are equal:
T - Hours
m
Fig. 1.—Selection Boundary for Preparedness Policies
It should be clear that the shape of the boundary curve is
determined by the formulae developed for the "limiting efficiencies"
and is dependent upon the characteristics of the failure distribution.
Thus far, we have not considered the many possible distributions
which might adequately display actual failure characteristics. A
considerable amount of the basic literature on preventive maintenance
has devoted itself to this implicit question and we can summarize




The cumulative density function (CDF) of failure, F(t)
,
for any system must increase with time and F(°°) = 1. The deri-
vative of this function, as noted earlier, is the probability
density function (PDF) of failure, f(t), and can decrease, remain
constant, or increase with time subject to the restriction:






f(x)dx = 1 .
The applicability of preventive maintenance action hinges on the
inter-relationship of the CDF and PDF for a given system as expressed
by the conditional failure rate (FR) for the system j (t) which has
been previously defined. It is this distribution which must be
examined in the analysis of preventive maintenance theory.
The most significant distributions which have been found
adequate to describe particular system failure characteristics are
the exponential, normal, log-normal, gamma, and Weibull. The CDF,
F(x) ; PDF, f(x); and FR, j (x) for each can now be examined and
the implication for preventive maintenance action briefly noted.
Exponential Distribution
x_
CDF: F(x) = 1 - e U
_
x
PDF: f (x) = - e V y = mean life
y











Fig. 2.—The Exponential Distribution
The exponential distribution is the distribution without
a memory. It exhibits a constant conditional probability of failure
which is not a function of the independent variable.
Preventive maintenance (or replacement) cannot be justified
for a system known to fail exponentially. The newest piece of
equipment, or newest system, will have the same likelihood of
failure as the oldest. In the cost minimization model, money will
be poorly spent if a PM program is adopted. Similarly for maximi-
zation of operating time, PM is not the answer. Redundancy, rather
than preventive maintenance, must be used to improve system
reliability.
The Poisson distribution, a discrete probability distribution
-m x
defined by P(x) = —
—
is not identical to the Exponential
x
distribution, a continuous probability distribution—but both are
frequently used in queueing theory and the literature is frequently
in error by equating them.
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It has been hypothesized that systems tend to fail exponentially
when they are characterized either by human errors , or by well-developed
techniques for minimizing failure, or by a wide range of environmental
12
severity. For mechanical systems, the exponential distribution is
characteristic of complex, multi-part installations where such a
random failure distribution may actually reflect the "averaging" effect
of the summation of sub-system failure distributions which are not
exponential in nature.
Normal (or Gaussian) Distribution—truncated at zero
y = mean of the distribution
= standard deviation of the distribution








z = standard normal variable with
u =
= 1 i.e. z = x-U






D. J. Davis, "An Analysis of Some Failure Data," Journal
of the American Statistical Association (June, 1952), pp. 115-150,

25








Fig. 3.—The Normal Distribution
One analysis found the following types of equipment
exhibiting failure characteristics corresponding to a normal
probability distribution: incandescent light bulbs; dry cell
batteries; and electric bus motors (for their time to initial
13
failure) . A sister distribution to the normal is the log-normal
where y is replaced by x = geometric mean (the anti-logarithm
of the mean of the logarithms) , and O is replaced by g =
geometric dispersion (the antilogarithm of the standard deviation





the FR for a log-normal distribution need not be strictly increasing




Fig. 4.—The Log-Normal Distribution
The log-normal distribution illustrates the first of several
distributions where preventive maintenance can sometimes , but not
always, be justified.
Gamma Distribution
a = shape parameter
b = scale parameter
< x < °°
CDF: (For a a positive integer)






















a = 1 (exponential)
% * 3 ^
L_
Fig. 5.—The Gamma Distribution
The gamma distribution has been widely used in management
science models. This distribution is closely related to the
exponential function (the exponential is the special case of the
gamma where parameter a = 1 ). Further, it can be called the
14
"natural conjugate" of the Poisson distribution. This can be
shown clearly by re-writing the CDF formula as
:





W. L. Shapleigh, "Reliability Testing," quoted in The Concept
of Material Readiness as Applied to Naval Vessels by Capt. J. L. McVoy





where the value to the right of the summation sign is the
expression for a Poisson probability distribution. Finally, in
the special case of the gamma where 2a = positive integer, the
gamma distribution is known as the Chi-Square Distribution so
widely used in statistical testing procedures. Obviously, from
examination, it is apparent that preventive maintenance for
equipment with failure characterized by a gamma distribution will
only be justified when a > 1 .
Weibull Distribution
(disregarding the usual "location" parameter")
_ itscale" parameter
b = "shape" parameter
-ax
CDF: F(x) = 1-e
PDF: f(x) = bax e
FR: j(x) = baxb-1
f(x)
PDF b = 3
j(x)






Preventive maintenance can only be justified for Weibull
distributions with a shape parameter > 1. Weibull distributions
have been useful primarily because they can realistically depict
composite systems according to the values assigned to the scale,
shape, and location parameters. By changing these values, this
distribution can assume the identities of the exponential,
1 (\
normal, or mixed distributions. Because of the complexity of
the equations, the Weibull distribution is most often utilized
where computer solution is available.
Composite Failure Distributions
The real life failure data from a piece of equipment may
not correspond closely to one of. the standard distributions. Over
the entire life of the system, it may exhibit changing failure
characteristics. Kammins and McCall have described the three
principal types of "mortality characteristics" as: Burn-In,
Random, and Wear-Out. This changing behavior may represent the
maturation of the failure rate over the life of the equipment and
is most representative for simple, mechanical systems. This















Fig. 7.—A Composite Distribution
Thus, it may be possible to represent the early phase of
equipment life with decreasing failure rate by a gamma distribution
with certain parameters. Later, an exponential distribution may
adequately describe the failure behavior for a portion of the
equipment life. Finally, the final period, Phase III, may be
approximated by a normal distribution displaying the increasing
rate of failure and justifying the installation of some type of
preventive maintenance policy.
Group Replacement
Our discussions to this point have concerned decisions,
policies, and characteristics of individual items subject to the
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possible maintenance function. It may sometimes, however, be
preferable to consider groups of like equipment and investigate
the desirability of group replacement in lieu of individual repair
or replacement at failure. Such a policy could either complement
a preventive maintenance program or serve in place of one. Ackoff
18
and Sasieni briefly discuss the possibility:
It often happens that a system contains a large number of
identical low-cost items that are increasingly liable to
failure with age and that there is a setup cost for replace-
ment that is independent of the number replaced. In such
cases , it may be advantageous to replace all items at fixed
intervals. Such a policy is called group replacement and
is particularly attractive when the value of any individual
items is so small that the cost of keeping records of
individual ages cannot be justified. The classic example
of such a policy is that used in replacing street light
bulbs; the major cost of replacement is the cost of bringing
a truck and crew to the defective bulb. Once the crew is
on the street, the additional labor cost of replacing every
bulb is extremely small. [Italics mine.]
A simplified model for this policy can be presented. If the
cost of replacement of all the items in the group (i.e. group
replacement) = C and the cost of the individual items replaced
as they fail = C
T
(t) where t = time since last group replacement







and with a group replacement interval, T, the average cost per
unit time, C. T ._,, isAVG
18
Russell L. Ackoff and Maurice W. Sasieni, Fundamentals of
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Fig. 8.—Group Replacement - Average Cost Function
Obviously, the nature of the function Cj(T) will be derived from
the probability density function of failure. It is possible to
solve such a model analytically using Markov transition matrices
and fixed point determination. A simpler, and less precise, deter-
cG
mination of time TG can be achieved by simply tabulating —
CX (T)
and — and initiating group replacement whenever their sum,
C ATTO , is observed to have reached its first minimum. Such aAVG
policy, while resulting in a T greater than necessary, may be
quite adequate
—




flat near minimum. In any instance, as for all models discussed
to date, the principal assumption must be that conditional
probability of failure increases with age. This restriction is
so common to preventive maintenance problems that it may be
refreshing to now turn to a class of problems where it need not
be adhered to.
Preventive Inspection
In the previous models , we have generally presumed that
any equipment failure was detected immediately. This may be valid
for equipment in more or less continuous operation where human
monitoring is frequent or constant. But certain classes of equip-
ment may only be used or operated under infrequent or emergency
conditions and hence will not be consistently monitored. If such
equipment deteriorates with age, it may not be available for use
19
when needed. A compound problem is created:
The only way to make certain that it is in working order
is to inspect it, but while it is being inspected, it is
unavailable for use as the need arises. The problem is
to find how often to inspect it so as to maximize the
proportion of time during which it is in working order.
Given that the stored item is uninspected for the interval
[0,x], it has a probability F(x) of working at age x.
a. Inspections take time t-, . We can assume for
the simplest model that if any defects are present
they will be found and repaired to "good as new"
condition. Later, we can allow for the possi-







b. If defects are found, they are repaired in
time t
9 .
c. The inspection interval is at time t from
last inspection period (including repair time
interval if any)
.
When inspected, the probability that the item is good is
F(t) and the item will again be good (after inspection only) at
time t + t
1
. The probability that the item is defective is
[1 - F(t)], and in this case, it will again be good at time
t + t.. + t_ . The average time required before the item is known
















It can be shown that the expected amount of time during which the
t-1
equipment is good will be G r = Z F(x) . Therefore, the proportionC








The optimal policy is that which maximizes P(t). For an exponential
failure distribution, F(x) = j (t) = Kx where K = constant; and
it can be bhown that from (1)
:










(2) ^ - (1-K) <4 +^>
and the optimal policy will be to minimize the right side of
equation (2). For non-zero, finite t, P(t) is not infinite
and must have a unique minimum.

CHAPTER III
THE NAVY'S 3-M SYSTEM
Background
In the preceding chapter, an examination was made of
representative examples of specific preventive maintenance
theories advanced in the field of Operations Research in the two
decades following World War II. Before beginning a description
of the shipboard preventive maintenance system as it exists today,
it may be valuable to highlight the Navy's involvement in prior
efforts of preventive inspection, group replacement, and preventive
maintenance in the shipboard area during the same time interval.
By the post-World War II era, standardization of shipboard
maintenance instructions and guidelines had begun to cluster into
three broad areas:
1. Electronics
(Radios, radars, sonars, and the like—equipment
which contained electronic circuitry principally
characterized by the presence of vacuum tubes -
and their associated test equipment—voltmeters,
signal generators, oscilloscopes, etc.)
2. Ordnance
(Naval guns with all associated ammunition storage




systems, torpedoes; fire control equipment including
electro-mechanical computers; optical sighting,
tracking, and ranging gear; small arms; etc.)
3. Hull, Mechanical and Electrical
(The ship's structure; its mechanical equipment
used for both main propulsion and auxiliary
support; electrical generation, distribution, and
appliance equipment; etc.)
This classification correlates both with the three operating depart-
ments of a combatant surface ship (Operations , Weapons , and Engineering)
,
and with the evolution of senior technical commands (formerly Bureaus
of the Department of the Navy and now Systems Commands of the Naval
Material Command) concerned with Electronic, Ordnance and Ship
Systems throughout the Navy.
In the area of shipboard hull, mechanical, and electrical
maintenance, requirements were prescribed for any ship from a variety
of command and directive sources, including:
1. Requirements established by the commanding officer
of the ship.
2. Requirements from senior operational commanders
(Division, Squadron, Flotilla, and Fleet Commanders).
3. Requirements from fleet ship type administrative




4. Requirements from the Department of the Navy Bureaus
charged with the maintenance management of such




Other sources of guidance or direction for the individual operating
unit (either duplicating or supplementing the above breakdown)
would include at least:
1. Manufacturer's recommendations as delineated in
instruction and maintenance manuals.
2. Suggestions from manufacturer field technical
representatives
.
3. Direction or guidance from the Navy Board of
Inspection and Survey.
4. Technical advice from Navy laboratories (e.g.
the Navy Boiler and Turbine Laboratory at
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania).
5. Recommendations of Navy repair activities
—
Shipyards, Repair Facilities, Industrial
Managers, and Repair Ships (tenders).
All of these diverse sources for guidance were highly interrelated,
but on the subject of preventive maintenance standards, there existed
no final authority for coordinating and controlling their activity.
The impact of this multi-channeled flow of maintenance direction
and advice to an individual ship is illustrated by Fig. 9.
The most comprehensive and best documented of these impacting
forces was the Engineer's "Bible"—the Bureau of Ships Technical
Manual (BSTM) . This 3-volume reference work contained almost 100
chapters covering practically all aspects of marine engineering
within the hull, mechanical, and electrical sphere. Mastery of


























Fig. 9.—Maintenance Guidance and Direction Before 3-M
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1. Its content varied from suggestive to permissive
to directive.
2. It was subject to only infrequent revision and
required further directive consultation to ensure
the timeliness of authority.
3. Each chapter was separately indexed and there was
no means to determine cross-indexing of require-
ments which crossed functional lines.
4. Shipboard copies of the document were generally
severely limited such that a complete manual was
typically available only to the Engineer Officer
and his immediate subordinates.
5. Reporting requirements, where existent, were
typically buried in chapter text and often
duplicated coverage of other information systems.
These included:
a. Letter reports concerning specific
inspections, material conditions, or
failure detection.
b. Informal Equipment Failure Reports designed
to be voluntarily submitted through semi-
official channels so as to stimulate open
communication of failure data without the
stigma of a required discrepancy report.
c. Periodic performance reports concerning system
tests and typically based on the timing of
the ship's overhaul cycle.
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The nature of this era of shipboard maintenance management
was summarized recently by Rear Admiral W. A. Brockett, former Chief
of the Bureau of Ships who expresses the need for a change in the
environment from that of fragmentation to one of integration:
Not so many years ago, shipboard maintenance lessons were
shared as gray-haired engineer officres of sister ships
met over coffee in log rooms or ward rooms [where they
discussed]
. . . the expertise of care and feeding the
plant endured by dint of long-hour tours of duty, [sic]
The idea of profiting from hard knocks is as old as man
himself, but a more fluid and demanding technology plus
the mobility of our human resources demands that we
systemize the vast mass of experience for organizing the
bits of data so as to find the meaningful trends, share
the lessons, and progress toward a higher level of effec-
tive utilization of resources and Fleet material readiness.
System Development
It is not essential to this current research to examine in
detail the historical evolution of the existing 3-M system, but a
few brief notes may aid in understanding its existing composition.
Initial implementation as a developmental pilot program was begun
in early 1963. Design, installation, and refinement of a system
of standardized preventive maintenance procedures and requirements
was conducted aboard the ships of Destroyer Squadrons Seven and
Thirty Two. Preliminary testing of what was to become the current
Planned Maintenance Sub-System had been conducted by experienced
engineering maintenance personnel of the Fleet Work Study Groups
on board the U.S.S. Lowry (DD-770) and the U.S.S. Agerholm (DD-826).'
W. A. Brockett, "Professional Notes," U.S. Naval Institute
Proceedings
,
Vol. 95, No. 5 (May, 1969), p. 145.
2
D. Ritchie, "Planned Maintenance—It Works," U.S. Naval
Institute Proceedings , Vol. 91, No. 9 (September, 1965), p. 144.
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It was recognized that standardization of procedures at
the operating level for specific equipment was only a partial
contribution to better maintenance results and improved readiness.
An information system was required to provide managers at all
echelons responsible for maintenance and material support with
detailed information on maintenance action for further planning,
improvement, and timely support of fleet requirements. This
general problem was given under contract by the Office of Naval
Research to the Logistics Research Project of the George Washington
3University in January, 1963. This Project, which had been active
in both Army and Navy logistical research since 1949, had previously
provided valuable assistance to the Navy in the improvement of
shipboard inventory control procedures. During 1961-62, it had
worked on the problems of maintenance and material support for the
Polaris Weapons System project. Much of this previous research "was
directly applicable to the problem of developing an integrated
management information system for the 3-M concept, It is further
useful to note that many of these same researchers had been active
in the inquiry into the definition of a useful material readiness
4index for shipboard application.
The Logistics Research Project worked jointly with the
Logistics and Mathematical Statistics Branch of the Office of Naval
Research and conducted a survey of information requirements for
3
Staff, Logistics Research Project, A Survey of Information
Requirements for Navy Maintenance and Material Management (Washington,
D.C.: The George Washington University, 1964), p. 1.
4
James E. Hamilton, Ship Material Readiness (Washington, D.C.:
The George Washington University, 1962), pp. 55-61.
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Navy maintenance and material management. This survey, which
covered managerial activities responsible for both aircraft and
shipboard maintenance and material, was conducted during the Fall
of 1963. This "User Survey" information was compiled, edited, and
computer processed at The George Washington University and initial
analysis was conducted in February, 1964, by Project research
personnel together with representatives of cognizant Navy Bureaus,
the Fleet Work Study Groups, and the Office of Naval Research.
The results of this analysis were formulated into a recommended
Integrated Navy Ship Maintenance and Material Information System.
Procedures were recommended for data collection, processing, and
dissemination. These procedures were to become the basis for what
is now the Maintenance Data Collection Sub-System (MDCS) of 3-M.
MDCS was introduced to the fleet commencing in late 1964—approximately
one year after the first ships received the PMS program. By mid-1970,
100% of the active fleet ships had converted fully to MDCS; 98% of the
active fleet currently have PMS implemented and that sub-system is




Logistics Research Project, Survey of Information
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pp. 3-11.
James E. Hamilton, An Integrated Navy Ship Maintenance and
Material Information System (Washington, D.C.: The George Washington
University, 1965), pp. 1-43.
James E. Hamilton, Suggested Procedures for an Integrated
Information System (Washington, D.C. : The George Washington
University, 1965), pp. 1-67.
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The Shipboard 3-M System, as revised through early 1971, is
officially defined as an "integrated management system" which
"... provides for orderly scheduling and accomplishment of
maintenance and for reporting and disseminating significant
maintenance related information." Its two sub-systems, PMS and
MDCS, are said to form "... the nucleus of a shipboard maintenance
program which can contribute significantly toward achieving improved
9fleet readiness with reduced expenditure of resources."
The Maintenance and Material Management (3-M) Manual (OPNAV
43P2) describes specific system objectives as they relate to the
assistance of operational and technical commanders toward achieving
the goal of optimum Fleet readiness utilizing available resources.
Six such specific objectives are identified:
a. Define and achieve uniform maintenance standards,
criteria, and procedures.
b. Assist operating forces by promoting effective utili-
zation of available manpower, material and maintenance
opportunities and by reducing the total administrative
burden on maintenance personnel.
c. Document the requirements for and the accomplishment
of maintenance, and the utilization of maintenance
assets.
d. Increase knowledge of current ship configuration and
identify desirable changes to existing configuration
or improvements in new ship configuration design,
through information gained by documenting maintain-
ability and reliability experiences.
e. Improve maintainability and reliability of equipments
and systems through uniform maintenance disciplines
9
U. S. Department of the Navy, Maintenance and Material
Management (3-M) Manual (OPNAV 43P2) (Washington, D.C.: Office




and improved engineering practices, identification
of essential design changes to existing equipments/
systems, and documentation of experience data of
value in new equipment /system design.
f. Accurately identify the cost of maintenance in
terms of manpower, material and funds, and reduce
these costs through maintenance efficiencies and
management effectiveness.
Can the concepts and objectives listed above be reconciled
with the goals of any set of previously developed preventive main-
tenance theories? This question—central to our research—will be
addressed in detail in the next chapter; at this point, however, a
few preliminary observations may prove useful. The term "integrated
management system" (italics mine) raises the obvious question: What
is integrated? It is believed by this author that the reference is
not to the integration of action by the universal application within
the surface naval community, but rather that the system is internally
integrated through the interface which must exist between its two
sub-systems, PMS and MDCS.
This notion of system integration is reinforced by the
wording of the quoted objectives in sub-paragraphs (e) and (f) above.
Reference is made to the improvement of engineering practices
(presumably including preventive maintenance) and the reduction of
costs through maintenance efficiencies and management effectiveness.
Does this mean that after application of uniform preventive main-
tenance standards in the PMS sub-system, the MDCS sub-system provides
the necessary feedback of failure and readiness data necessary for
system alteration and improvement? Can we validly describe a partial
intent of the total system to provide a cybernetic loop for the
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monitoring of system performance and the correction of deficiencies?
This hypothesis might be simplistically viewed as a closed system

























Fig. 10.—Hypothesis of 3-M Integration
To study these questions, it is necessary to examine the 3-M
sub-systems, analyze their objectives, operating procedures, and
inter-relationships. In the next section we will consider first
the operation of the PMS Sub-System; attention will then be given




The Planned Maintenance Sub-System (PMS)
In a terminology section of the 3-M Manual, preventive
maintenance is defined as "those maintenance actions performed on
equipment to maintain uninterrupted operation within design charac-
teristics or to detect and/or prevent failures before they occur."
Planned Maintenance is then defined as "preventive maintenance
accomplished on a regular periodic basis." The caveat "within
design characteristics" is important, for it permits failure char-
acteristics which do not exceed those which can be computed from
the reliability and maintainability equipment design standards.
Perfect equipment operation is not visualized; but a minimum standard
for the preventive maintenance program is established.
The PMS Sub-System is described as a program which will
provide each ship , operating department , and individual maintenance
supervisor (Work Center Supervisor) with the necessary planning,
scheduling, and control tools to effectively implement a preventive
maintenance policy consistent with the overall 3-M objectives. The
12
specific objectives of PMS are expressed as designed to:
a. Reduce complex maintenance to simplified procedures,
easily identified and managed at all levels.
b. Define the minimum planned maintenance required,
schedule and control its performance, describe the
methods and tools to be used and provide for the
detection and prevention of impending casualties.
c. Forecast and plan manpower and material requirements.
d. Plan and schedule maintenance tasks.











f. Detect areas requiring additional or improved personnel
training and/or improved maintenance techniques or
attention.
Benefits to be derived from PMS are described in the manual





5. Improved Management and Maintenance "Morale"
6. Training Opportunities
13
7. Continuity of Maintenance Control
The principal tools of the PMS which contribute toward the attainment
of the described objectives and associated benefits are:
1. PMS Manual (OPNAV 43P1) containing Maintenance
Index Pages (MIP's) (OPNAV 4700-3)
2. Cycle Schedules (OPNAV 4700-4)
3. Quarterly Schedules (OPNAV 4700-5)
4. Weekly Schedules (OPNAV 4700-6)
5. Maintenance Requirement Cards (MRC's) (OPNAV 4700-1)
Samples of each of the above can be found in Exhibits 1-4 of Appendix A
and may be useful for reference in the brief description which follows.
Each individual work center aboard ship is provided a PMS Manual
which contains necessary basic instructions and a group of MIP's
—
one each for every different type of equipment (pump, motor, radar set,




An MIP lists the PM checks by periodicity and provides information
on the skill level (rate and rating), manpower, and time required
for each PM action as well as correlating related PM actions so that;
they may then be scheduled concurrently. The cycle, quarterly, and
weekly schedules then provide the means for departmental and work
center managers to schedule these maintenance actions with increasing
precision ranging from a selection of the quarter assignment (within
a 12 quarter, 3 year overhaul cycle) to the specific assignment of a
repairman or repair team to a specific action on a given day of the
current week. Finally, the maintenance action is performed in
accordance with the standardized procedures of the MRC which is kept
in the work center with the weekly schedule. As shown in the sample
(Appendix A, Exhibit 4), an MRC provides additional detailed data
including safety precautions, tools and material required, and
"Work Study" developed maintenance action procedures. The accom-
plishment, or non-accomplishment, of scheduled PM actions are
annotated on weekly and quarterly schedules and the latter are
14
retained on board as a record of planned maintenance accomplishment.
With the brief understanding of PMS provided above, three
questions emerge in an attempt to relate this 3-M sub-system to
theoretical preventive maintenance models and policies
:
1. How is a specific type of equipment chosen for
inclusion under the PMS?
2. How are the MRC actions determined?
3. How is the periodicity of each MRC calculated?
14
Ibid.
, pp. 3-1 to 3-30.
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This paper's research has indicated that definitive answers
to the above questions are surprisingly difficult to obtain. For
most shipboard equipment, the relevant official publication is the
Planned Maintenance Development Specification Manual of the Naval
Ship Systems Command (NAVSHIPS 0900-039-1010). "It prescribes
policy and procedure for the development of Maintenance Index Pages,
Maintenance Requirement Cards and support documentation."
The Development Specification Manual classifies maintenance
into five types
:
a. Safety - care to avoid conditions that endanger
personnel or stress material beyond reliability;
b. Operating - immediate and constant tasks that cause
equipment to do the job designed to do;
c. Preventive - scheduled periodic tasks of care and
inspection designed to prevent a breakdown or prolong
the life of equipment;
d. Corrective - unscheduled tasks required to restore
equipment to an operational status after a breakdown
or impending failure is discovered;
e. Overhaul - complete disassembly and reconditioning
to a like-new status.
The manual then notes that these types of maintenance will generally
be accomplished through two classes of tasks: Care and Inspection.
Care is defined as "adding or taking away something" (lubrication,
replacement of worn parts, etc.) and Inspection is described as "the
use of the senses alone or in conjunction with a tool" (inspect
safety devices, examine visually for tightness, measure clearances,
U. S. Department of the Navy, Naval Ship Systems Command,
Planned Maintenance Development Specification Manual (NAVSHIPS 0900-







etc.). We can construct a matrix to indicate the possible
combinations of this two-dimensional classification.
Types
Tasks






















MAINTENANCE TO CARE [MAINTENANCE
OR OPPORTUNISTIC! OR
INSPECTION REPLACEMENT! INSPECTION
Fig. 11.— Classification of Maintenance
The manual notes that PMS will concentrate on type 3 maintenance
but may include more extensive overhaul action (type 5) . Types 1
and 2 are described as tasks of at least daily frequency and may
be included in PMS. Corrective maintenance (type 4) is unscheduled
but may be covered by a situational MRC which is essentially an
"as required" periodicity. The matrix, Fig. 11, is annotated with






In discussing the PMS "philosophy," it is stated that:
PM tasks are deliberate and regulated care, coupled with
intervals of recorded inspection (that portray a trend
or a deviation from operating standards) , to maintain a
materially ready condition. Any deviation in performance
must be presented to the controller in sufficient time to
allow the care to be altered, thus eliminating the break-
down and a later need for corrective maintenance. ... A
usable record of accomplished PM and accomplished correc-
tive work (not covered by PM) is necessary in order that
a history be accumulated to justify the relaxing of some
requirement or the establishment of new ones. This history
must be relayed to a central agency within a command so
that all like activities can benefit through method
improvements, generated as a result of the feedback,
and decisions can more rapidly be made.
Later, in the instructions covering the selection of a periodi-
city for an MRC under development, the proper choice is said to be
that:
19
which is the minimum amount of expenditure (manhours/
material) for the equipment operating at an expected
average demand and within an environment which would
prevail for the majority of like items. . . . The intent
is that the major population of the fleet should not be
levied with periodicities adjusted to assure reliability
under exceptional conditions.
The following summary points appear relevant to the limited
survey of the PMS sub-system conducted, its methodology, and rela-
tionship to theoretical concepts previously developed:
1. PMS is essentially a management engineering approach
to the problem of optimum work standardization and
simplification. It uses accepted systems and pro-




. , pp. 3-2 to 3-3.
19
Ibid. , Chapter 5.
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2. PMS development is a judgmental process which
utilizes a wide-variety of source data including
historical maintenance and failure information,
but this development is not part of a continuing
feedback of information and refinement.
3. PMS is conceived and developed for aggregate
systems and equipment. It seeks to specify a
standard "lowest common denominator" toward meeting
design standards for a vaguely defined "normal" or
"majority" portion of the total population.
4. PMS acknowledges the need for a management infor-
mation system to collect data for feedback and
system improvement, but it does not identify such
a system or explicitly describe a formal inter-
relationship. Specifically, PMS is able to stand
alone without dependence on the sister MDCS
sub-system.
From the PMS side of the 3-M system, it is difficult to sight
the anticipated interface with MDCS; it is now necessary to investi-
gate from the other side and see if the fragmentation is as pronounced
from the vantage point of the information system.
The Maintenance Data Collection Sub-System (MDCS)
The MDCS has been the more volatile of the two 3-M sub-systems.
It has undergone the greatest revision in terms of both system content
and format, experienced the widest criticism, and probably sparked
the greatest abuses in overall 3-M operation and evolution. At the
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time of this research, MDCS is undergoing the latest in a continuing
series of reviews and studies, and, at least for some interim
period, has been curtailed to the extent of reducing fleet reporting,
20
requirements by 40%.
The scope of the sub-system has been partially described as
... 21providing:
a means for maintenance personnel to record information
pertaining to preventive or corrective maintenance actions.
The system uses coded data elements for recording much of
this information in order to standardize the data collected
and to facilitate its processing and use. The failure and
corrective action information recorded on the maintenance
action documents , and the material usage information
recorded on associated supply documents, is retrievable
through this system for engineering analysis and main-
tenance history.
MDCS has, through its seven year history, collected a changing
mix of maintenance information including:
1. Preventive (PMS) Maintenance Actions Performed
2. Preventive Maintenance Actions Not Performed
(exception reporting)
3. Corrective Maintenance Actions Performed
4. Deferral of Maintenance Actions (Preventive or
Corrective) due to operational or resource
requirements /limitations
5. Completion of Deferred Maintenance Actions









7. Requests for Work Assistance Internal to the
Reporting Organization
8. Material Inspection Discrepancies
9. Exception Time Reporting for Maintenance Activity
Manpower Utilization
10. Material Usage Data Associated with Maintenance
Actions
.
Collection of data records such as those above has been from
fleet units (individual ships) , intermediate activities (repair ships
and tenders) , and maintenance depots (ship repair facilities and
shipyards). By 1971, the first eight types of records had been
incorporated into a single multi-purpose documentation form, OPNAV
FORM 4790/2K shown as Appendix B. Previously, a variety of hand-
coded forms had been used depending upon the type of maintenance
action. Although no longer practiced, certain fleet activities have
occasionally utilized pre-punched IBM cards to report the accomplish-
ment of standard PMS actions in an effort to reduce manual form
preparation. The current document provides a variety of alternative
coding schemes. Data fields vary for different types of actions but
a representative sample for the reporting of a corrective maintenance
22
action include:
1. Organizational identification (to the reporting
work center level aboard ship)
2. Equipment identification (including specific
identification where more than one such equipment




pp. 4-9 to 4-24.
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3. The nature of the first indication of equipment
malfunction
4. The operating environment in which the malfunction
was discovered (Operating, Starting, Stopping,
Inspection, etc.)
5. The date of malfunction discovery
6. The operational availability of the equipment
after discovery of trouble
7. The action taken to complete repair
8. The number of manhours (to the nearest 1/10)
required for repair
9. The rate/rating of the senior repairman
10. The date repairs are completed
11. The status (operational) of the equipment after
maintenance action completion
12. The activity's best determination of the cause
of the equipment failure or malfunction.
Additionally, provision is made for additional time data for equipment
with installed meters or counters to record active maintenance time,
troubleshooting time, and actual meter readings.
Since 1969, there has been little required reporting of
preventive (PMS) maintenance actions and documents forwarded by
ships have been limited to:
1. Completed maintenance actions involving malfunction
correction.




3. Requests for outside work assistance.
4. Feedback reporting of 3-M system discrepancies,
request for technical advice or alteration of system
procedures /requirements. (Such feedback reports
can vary widely from a simple ship report that it
has lost an MRC and requires a replacement to a
request for coverage of a newly installed system
for which PMS requirements and MDCS coding data
are not existent.
Source documents such as the above are prepared aboard ship,
forwarded to the appropriate Type Commander, processed to varying
degrees according to ADP capabilities, and finally forwarded to the
MDCS master data bank at the Maintenance Support Office, Mechanics-
burg, Pennsylvania. Those Type Commanders (or ships) possessing
sufficient ADP processing capacility produce data products for local
management use. The mission of the Maintenance Support Office (MSO)
23includes the responsibility in the 3-M program for:
1. Operating and maintaining a central data processing
center.
2. Supporting the Chief of Naval Operations in the
management of the 3-M System.
3. Providing the necessary information to determine
resource requirements for weapons systems, ship and
aircraft material readiness, and cost and effective-
ness at all levels of weapons systems.
4. Providing routine information reports to technical
bureaus [System Commands] and Fleet Activities.
5. Developing and maintaining master files of 3-M data.
23
Chester R. Oberg, "The Role of the Maintenance Support




6. Developing techniques for the coordination of 3-M
data with inventory control points, using such files




Providing information on the maintenance of the 3-M
System.
There are literally hundreds of output products produced by
MSO. These include Type Commander Maintenance Analysis Reports
(classifying maintenance actions, their manpower utilization, and
material costs by activity), Composite Cost Analysis Reports, and
Ship's Material History Reports (essentially the periodic updating
of a cumulative transaction file for each ship
—
prepared monthly
with semi-annual, and annual summaries on request.) MSO has an
Operations Research Division. This branch is concerned primarily
with the validity of all MSO data and uses various analytical tech-
24
niques to monitor the "quantity, quality, and timeliness" of MSO
inputs and outputs. No evidence has been found to indicate that
this Division has ever attempted to apply any of the theories
presented in the preceding chapter. Further, this Division is not
in direct liaison with outside activities, particularly those
involved in the development of shipboard PMS software (Naval Ship
System Command, Fleet Work Study Group, etc.).
All indications seem to reveal only the loosest of connections
between the 3-M sub-systems in terms of the feedback of data and
system refinement. There exists a Feedback Report system, but it
is based upon individual command initiation, not data analysis or




the fleet as well as to technical commands, but the existing programs
are not utilized to attempt a refinement via analytical techniques.
Finally, PMS, while highly successful as an example of work simpli-
fication and standardization, seems to offer little improvement in
the dynamic capability to analyze increasingly massive quantities of
experiential data and adjust to changing conditions.
Perhaps it is now possible to redraw a new view of the 3-M
system showing that it is not accurately a closed-loop system but



















Fig. 12.—Degree of Actual 3-M Integration
It is argued that the present system only vaguely defines the nature
of connections A and B. Further almost all data products are
oriented toward the loose closing of the loop via path A, rather
than via path B which would encompass the real integration of PMS




THEORY APPLICATION FOR 3-M
We have, to this point, accumulated a base of information concerning
both theoretical and actual policies of preventive maintenance. It now
appears plausible to examine such congruence as exists between the two;
develop a rationale to explain observed divergence; and investigate the
extent to which formal theoretical models have been employed in the ship-
board 3-M system.
Like the Preparedness PM model, the 3-M system appears to have
the primary objective of achieving a defined level of output (which
might best be thought of as designed contribution to readiness) with
the minimum resource utilization. This does not imply that the 3-M
system is analogous to the strict cost-minimization model. Costs and
benefits are both involved, and with a given level of required benefit,
effectiveness is maximized by the adjustment of system inputs that
achieves minimum cost. In an economic sense, readiness may be thought
of as the "revenue" accruing to the system, and effectiveness is
therefore comparable to the "profit" which is to be maximized.
Both the theoretical models presented and the 3-M system operation
described recognize and deal with the stochastic nature of the maintenance
environment. MDCS analysis presently includes a program which periodically




approximation with an exponential probability distribution. As has
been previously suggested, the results of such analysis are, however,
more typically forwarded to equipment design and procurement activities
(for use as reliability and maintainability data) than those activities
charged with the responsibility of updating PMS requirements and
periodicities
.
Much of the divergence observed between the models and the 3-M
practice can be traced to the real world actualities which require
abandonment of the useful, but often artificial, assumptions of the
simpler theoretical policies. PMS, for example, recognizes that
equipment failure is not always an instantaneous process, but rather
often characterized by gradual deterioration and accompanying performance
degradation. Further, it seeks to provide for a frequency of inspective
maintenance which will detect such deterioration before the final
"failure" is observed by operating personnel.
In the first cost-minimization model, the needed cost data was
given as that of before-failure PM and after-failure corrective
maintenance. One basis of the PMS "philosophy," however, is the degree
of variability of the latter after-failure cost. Even disregarding the
effect on material readiness, the nature of the shipboard maintenance
environment is such that corrective costs are a function of variables
such as ship location, operational employment, tempo of activity,
personnel manning, etc. PM "costs" may also exhibit some degree of
Private interviews with the staff for Program Development of
the Maintenance Management Branch of the Fleet Maintenance Directorate




variability—in any event, PMS scheduling flexibility is designed, in
part, to allow maintenance managers the ability to capitalize on periods
of lower cost factors.
In the most basic comparison, it appears that the principal
difference between the approaches is developed from the theoretical
assumption that each hour of equipment operation is equivalent in terms
of incremental utility. The operable state of shipboard equipment does
not, however, make a constant contribution of utility to the activity
or its mission. That is to say, the contribution to material readiness
of a particular system or component is variable with time and place.
This contribution is, of course, also interrelated with the operational
capability of other components or systems. Such variability with time
and space and the integration of total system effectiveness have been
the characteristics which have spurred research into the development of
a meaningful index of a ship's material readiness.
The concept of material readiness and its impact on policies of
preventive maintenance need not be considered as applicable uniquely
to a military environment. Similar problems could be developed and
stated for industrial situations. The notion of readiness has received
2
attention in areas such as NASA's manned space flight program. Our
specific task is now to examine its meaning in the Navy and the impact
of such a determination on the reconcilliation between theoretical PM
and the 3-M system.
2
R. B. Carpenter, Jr., "Space: Manned Interplanetary Travel,






In a contract project for the Office of Naval Research previously
referred to, the Logistics Research Project made one of the earliest
investigations into the definition of material readiness. The report
of this research postulated that overall ship readiness could be
3







This research, which stressed that material readiness was a measure of
the interaction of the latter two factors, then formulated a model of
a ship's material readiness such that an index measuring this capacity
was defined:
R = Ship Material Readiness Index
sm
The index was seen to be a function of the influences of ship design,
condition, reliability, and time. Specifically, where
D = original design of the ship when she first enters
service;
D = D + D
,
with D = change in D due to added
c a x a o
features (+ or -)
,
3
J. E. Hamilton, Ship Material Readiness
,
(Washington, D. C.





D = change in D due to excised
x o
features (+ or -)
;
C = The condition or measure of the capacity of the
material to perform, in use or action, to the
limits for which it was designed;
E = A measure of dependability or reliability for
continued functioning;
T = The period for which a decision is to be performed;
T = The length of time, after a decision, to accomplish
2L
a change (as for D , D above)
;
3. X
T = The length of time of expected continued reliability;






C, E, T, T , T , T ) .
sm o c a r e
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The research concluded that:
This expression is offered as a complete statement of the things
which must be considered, as applicable , to the material readi-
ness of any individual ship. Each of the factors must be
developed to fit the situation (normally time defined) for which
ship material readiness is to be determined.
Although this LRP paper has never been formally adopted by the
Navy, it is interesting because it immediately predates that project's
developmental work for the MDCS sub-system. Indeed, the multiple factors
which are shown to influence the composite index (and by inference, any
system or equipment separately analyzed) are all available from reporting







In his survey of the concept of readiness, McVoy notes a more
recent (1969) proposal for a Military Condition Index (MCI)—also a
product of the LRP
:
The general scheme of the George Washington model calls for
a structuring of a ship's material as "line elements" within
"function" groups which, in turn, make up "departments." A
block of 100 points was first assigned to each department
and these points were, in turn, prorated among the respective
functions according to the importance of each function, then
the line elements received a further prorating of the points
allotted to the function.
A multiplying process was conducted next to obtain the
Military Worth [MW] evaluation of each line element, function,
and department. These were to total 10,000 points for a ship.
Thus
,
£MWQ i Q 10,000 pointselem ' r
EMWfunc = 10,000 points
EMWd = 10,000 points
A verification process has been in effect on this break-
down utilizing feedback information from grading data provided
by the Board of Inspection and Survey [INSURV] for individual
ships. The grades were . . . accorded numerical values of
5,4,3,2,1. . . . These factors were treated arithmeti-
cally as follows : . . .




As McVoy notes, this methodology contains two significant
judgmental elements—the determination of Military Worth point allo-
cation and the grading conducted by INSURV. Further, although INSURV
discrepancies are now reported through the MDCS, there is currently no
provision for the sub-system to incorporate grading fields down to the
"element" level. For both of these reasons, it would seem unlikely that
this latter LRP index scheme can usefully be incorporated as a link
between the 3-M system and a quantitative model.




The most recent proposal to the Chief of Naval Operations for a
material readiness index has been developed by the aforementioned
Captain James McVoy. Working for the Ship Material Readiness Division
of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, McVoy has developed a
quantitative technique based partly on previous work conducted by the
Weapon-Systems Effectiveness Industrial Advisory Committee (WSEIAC) to
the Air Force Systems Command. The WSEIAC model describes Weapons
System Effectiveness (WSE) as: "WSE = f(A,D,C)" where:
A = Availability, a measure of the condition of the
system at the start of a mission,
when the mission is called for at
an unknown (random) instant of time.
D = Dependability, a measure of the system condition
during the performance of the mission;
given its condition (availability)
at the start.
C = Capability, a measure of the results of the
mission, given the condition during
the mission.
In other words, WSE = A x D x C where
A = Probability (System is Up)
D = Probability (System stays Up | System is Up)
C = Probability [Mission Accomplishment | (System







According to McVoy , material readiness is a measure of the relative
effectiveness of a weapons system (or other ship system) , that is a
measure R = Probability (Effectiveness - actual >, Effectiveness -„
required), or alternatively there is some factor, k, a measure of
readiness such that:
Effectiveness. , = k • Effectiveness.,, s ,Actual Required
The definition of availability, dependability, and capability as
the stochastic variables comprising system effectiveness has achieved
considerable attention in the literature. Blanchard and Lowery, have,
for example, used them in their conception of a hierarchy of trade-off
parameters linking the notion of design maintainability to overall system
cost-effectiveness. This ascending order of parameters is shown in
Fig. 13.
In an earlier work on the subject of designed maintainability,
Goldman and Slattery describe a similar construction of the inter-
relationship of the components of system effectiveness. In all such
works researched, preventive maintenance, if mentioned, is treated
peripherally as a scheduling set of design decisions—one of the
elements of maintainability. Considerable attention to this equipment
design aspect of preventive maintenance has been given by the Logistics
and Operations Planning Operation (TEMPO) of the General Electric
Company. Navy contracting involvement in TEMPO investigations has
A. S. Goldman and T. B. Slattery, Maintainability: A Major
Element of System Effectiveness
,




been concentrated in the area of the Fire Control and Guidance
o
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Fig. 13.—Order of Trade-Off Parameters'
Department of Defense recognition of this interrelationship
is expressed in the standards and requirements of two directives
which quantify M (maintainability) : DOD Directives //3200.6 of
7 June 62 and #4100.35 of 19 June 64. A specific military specifi-
cation of the Naval Ship Systems Command (Mil-M-23313) on the
"Maintainability Requirements for Shipboard and Shore Electronics
Equipment and Systems" is illustrative of such standardization:
Maintainability Requirements. The procuring activity will
specify an equipment repair time (ERT) in the detailed
equipment or systems specification. The design of the equipment
or system shall be such that the geometric mean of all active
repair time intervals required to repair independent failures
shall not exceed the specified ERT. Compliance with this
requirement will be verified in the final design stage, and
in the pre-production and production stages.
9Benjamin S. Blanchard and E. Edward Lowery, Maintainability
(New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1969), p. 119. Fig. 13 is
adapted from their Fig. 7-1.
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The discussion of preventive maintenance in the context of
maintainability and equipment design digresses somewhat from our
consideration of an operational maintenance policy, but is valuable
to highlight the perspective of this thesis. The broader, operational,
view of preventive maintenance allows its consideration not as merely
a "5th order" parameter as in Fig. 13, but also as interrelated with
each of the "3rd order" parameters which determine system effectiveness.
In a separate paper prepared for the Office of the Chief of Naval
Operations, McVoy has developed a calculation technique for determining
an individual ship's material readiness index. This involves the
analysis of the essential systems of the total ship system, their sub-
systems, supporting primary and redundant equipment; the assignment of
an exponential grading methodology through the analysis of both quanti-
tative and qualitative data; and a calculation procedure involving
standardized tabulation charts and derived nomographs for determination
of the critical variables (availability, reliability, etc.). Informa-
tion is provided on the characteristics of specific failure data. It
is not necessary for our present purpose to examine the technique in
detail, but it is useful to note that among the sources of data utilized
10
are Casualty Reports, INSURV discrepancies, and 3-M data.
McVoy does not elaborate on the exact nature of the 3-M data
which he envisions to be useful nor does he address the question of this
paper regarding the application of his computed readiness index toward
improvement of preventive maintenance practice. Nonetheless, the
J. L. McVoy,. The Analysis and Measure of a Ship's Material
Condition and Readiness
,
(Washington, D. C. : Office of the Chief of
Naval Operations (Op-433F-2) , 1970), pp. 63-68.
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opportunity which exists merits additional attention and research.
There is indication that a general standardized technique for the
measurement of ship material readiness is being refined and may soon
be adopted for the Navy. Such a methodology will be able to utilize
existing MDCS data and undoubtedly suggest improved formats for its
collection. It may also provide some of the necessary linkage between
the two 3-M sub-systems such that PMS development can move in a direction
away from the judgmental approach to one employing quantitative pro-
cedures of Operations Research allowing at least some of the following
advantages to develop
:
1, Elimination of Preventive Maintenance Requirements
which do not contribute to the objectives of 3-M.
2, Adoption of new PM where it will add toward the
achievement of 3-M goals
.
3. Refinement of PMS requirement periodicities to
provide the optimum contribution.
4. Improved accuracy and speed in the feedback of 3—
M
information due to the use of computer calculation
of the quantifiable system variables.
5, The possibility of segregating 3-M data by specific
activities or groups of activities so that a PMS
package can be individually tailored for a unit not
only on the basis of its unique equipment configura-
tion but also on the basis of the uniqueness of those
factors contributing to readiness aboard a specific ship.
6. The morale boost so obviously needed by fleet
maintenance personnel which will accrue when main-
tenance data submitted at the work center level is
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returned in the form of a recommendation for improve-
ment of preventive maintenance to benefit the
individual ship rather than as a mere tabulation of
the work which the personnel are well aware of having
expended.
A New Integration for the 3-M System
It has just been suggested that a viable measure of material
readiness may aid in bridging the existing gulf between PMS and MDCS.
Such a notion may be true, but it must be stated in a more comprehensive
context and subjected to certain limitations. A more complete statement
of the idea being developed is that Operations Research (specifically
the preventive maintenance models) is the vehicle for integrating the
3-M system and the measurement of material readiness provides an
alternative criteria for policy determination using the PM models.
As an example, it may be possible in some instances to redefine
the right side of the cost minimization model presented in Chapter II.
o
This value, previously defined as -r-rr might now express a readiness
relationship where:
A = Loss of material readiness per unit after failure
(during corrective maintenance period) , and
B = Loss of material readiness per unit before failure
(during preventive maintenance period)
.




It will not be possible to utilize such a readiness criteria for
all equipment presently covered by the PMS sub-system. PMS coverage has
been extended to almost all maintainable shipboard equipment. Much of
this equipment is located in shipboard systems which will not, and
should not, be measured by a military readiness assessment of material.
While it is possible to argue that all equipment placed aboard a naval
ship must ultimately contribute in some measure to the military capabil-
ities of the ship, some practical limits must be established.
The record selectors (juke boxes) provided for the crew's
recreational areas may enhance overall ship readiness by their positive
contribution to morale. But we will probably wish to maintain such
equipment on a cost-minimization policy; not on the basis of aggregate
material readiness. Similarly, a steam press in the ship's laundry
(operated on a 24 hour basis) might best be evaluated by a policy which
attempts to maximize operating time without regard to calculations
involving availability, dependability, and capability. Other examples
could be cited, but the basic observation must be that there will be
different populations of equipment and ship systems for which varying
criteria and PM policies can be adopted.
A more fundamental limitation of a compound criteria such as
material readiness is that a policy derived to maximize this quantified
measure will provide only a sub-optimization of the ultimate organiza-
tional objective. Commanding Officers of ships are responsible for the
composite function of ship readiness of which material readiness is but
one component. To the extent that maximization of material readiness
detracts from the proper mix of resources to other components, such as
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personnel or supply readiness, the sub-optimization achieved will not
produce the best total ship system effectiveness. This deficiency
exists, however, at all levels of defense management and its treatment
is deferred as beyond the scope of the present work.
The application of theoretical preventive maintenance models to
the 3-M system can involve more than the determination of maintenance
frequency. Indeed, the determination of PM periodicity may be the most
difficult of the theories to implement within the existing system. This
difficulty, whether for preventive maintenance or preventive inspection,
is principally the result of criteria determination. Other operations
research concepts in Renewal Theory may be easier to recommend and apply
for the 3-M system, particularly the techniques of the PMS sub-system.
Specifically, attention will be given to utilization of group replacement
and opportunistic inspection/maintenance policies.
It has been the experience of this author that group replacement
policies, where practiced in the fleet, are more typically the result
of local initiative as opposed to centralized guidance. Further, most of
the group replacement actions which have been observed are justified on
engineering beliefs rather than economic considerations. Finally,
specific PMS maintenance requirements which direct group replacement are
rare. These personal observations of the subject were confirmed by
representatives of the Naval Ship Systems Command during research
11interviews
.
Private interviews, Mr. H. T. Felsen (Navships 04113) and others
held at Arlington, Virginia, January, 1971. Also a briefing by Capt.
James McVoy and members of his staff, Naval Ship's Engineering Center,
Hyattsville, Maryland, January, 19 71.
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A simple example may aid in illustrating the above observation.
A PMS requirement common to all naval ships is the daily inspection and
testing of the navigational lights electrical system just prior to sunset.
This procedure, which evolved long before the 3-M system, requires that
an electrician check the satisfactory operation of all such lights,
correct any noted deficiencies, and report such action to the Officer
of the Deck. The most common deficiency is, of course, a defective
bulb which must be replaced. Some of the lights are readily accessible,
but others located on the ship's mast require a considerable expenditure
of time and effort to replace. These masthead lights must be reached
by climbing the ship's masts—a hazardous job at sea involving many
safety precautions involving safety equipment, extra men, and the
securing of critical electronic equipment (radios and radars) which
temporarily degrades the ship's military readiness.
It seems logical to assume that the rational basis for the
inspection requirement is based upon the failure characteristics of
such lights exhibiting increasing wear-out over time. The individual
cost of replacement bulbs is very small in relation to the other costs
of the repair operation. This is, in fact, the classic group replace-
12
ment case quoted from Ackoff and Sasieni in Chapter II. Yet, except
where individual managerial initiative aboard ship adopts such a group
replacement policy and instructs electricians to replace all masthead
lights whenever one fails , the Navy does not provide guidance in this
area.
Light bulbs onamast, piston rings in a diesel engine, vacuum
tubes in a small electronic component—all are fair examples which merit
12
See page 31, Chapter II.

75
analysis for the use of group replacement policies. As before, the use
of quantitative analysis can link the failure data collected by MDCS to
improvements to PMS procedures which specify group replacement where
warranted. Such attention and analysis may also result in fleet accept-
ance of the underlying theory so that time-honored group replacement
policies which are not valid can be reduced. In an era of increasing
fiscal austerity for the operating forces, the practice of group
replacement must be subject to economic analysis, not merely the personal
intuition or convenience of the repairman.
The implementation of an analytical procedure for determining the
desirability of group replacement requirements in the PMS would seem to
offer an excellent means to test the managerial problems which might be
encountered in a broader application of Operations Research models in
3-M System operation. Existing 3-M data could be used to select a limited
number of equipment for a pilot application of such a program. MDCS
feedback would be monitored, fleet reaction assessed, and analytical and
administrative techniques improved in a limited use of Operations Research
modeling.
A maintenance policy closely related to group replacement is known
as "opportunistic inspection." Simply stated, such a policy makes the
inspection of a non-monitored part conditional on the state (good or
failed) of a monitored part. Research in the theory of such policies
involving either the maintenance action of inspection or replacement
has been extensive at the Rand Corporation with particular emphasis in
the systems associated with rocket engines where only certain parts are
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regularly monitored. A brief description of the basic idea of this
13
maintenance policy is given in a Rand Memorandum:
Optimal inspection of part [non-monitored] in presence of
monitored part 1 •
(1) If part 1 fails in interval 0$t<n, replace part 1 by
itself.
(2) If part 1 fails in interval n£t<N, inspect part 0,
if part has not failed, replace part 1 by itself, if
part has failed, replace both parts.
(3) If part has not been inspected in the interval 0<t£N,
inspect part at t = N and replace if failed.
In this policy, t = age or time since the last inspection of part 0.
The referenced paper illustrates a means of calculating the critical
numbers n and N given the downtime costs and inspected part failure
rates (assumed in this model to be exponential) . The derivation of the
policy closely resembles that of Barlow and Hunter presented in Chapter II.
Somce measure of an opportunistic policy is currently practiced
within the PMS sub-system by the identification of "related maintenance
requirements" on individual MRC'S. This guidance to the shipboard
maintenance manager is not a pure opportunistic policy, however, for it
provides for the consolidation of two or more preventive actions (which
would correspond to the notion of a policy involving parts and 1 where
both parts were monitored). Further, no detail is provided to the
scheduling maintenance manager as to those conditions which would recom-
mend the consolidation of maintenance action. Typically, these relation-
ships are the aggregation of those lesser PM actions whose accomplishment
is facilitated by the disassembly of equipment for a more extensive PM
14
13
John J. McCall, Support Requirements for Opportunistic Replace-
ment and Inspection Policies , Rand Memorandum RM 3369, (Santa Monica,
Calif.: The Rand Corporation, 1962), p. 4.
See pages 18-21, Chapter II.
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check. Finally, the determination of the related actions in the process
of MRC development is principally judgmental and based upon the concepts
of work simplification and duplication of effort. No quarrel is advanced
against this approach, but it seems possible to expand it to include time
related "opportunistic inspection" when failure data can show a corre-
lation between separate part failures and a savings in downtime costs or
other PM policy criteria.
As an example for possible investigation of an application of the
above policy, it is possible to discuss two interrelated components
(both monitored under PMS, but with separate and "unrelated" PM checks)
which are common aboard most naval ships. These are the manual and
overspeed trips provided for most large mechanical prime movers (diesel
engines, steam turbines, etc). The former provides a means for operating
personnel to quickly secure the equipment in an emergency; the latter is
a device which automatically secures the equipment should its rotational
speed exceed some design safety standard. PMS requirements for such
devices are reasonably standard. They generally require the manual
devices to be tested each time the unit is started or stopped and the
automatic overspeed trips to be tested at a greater frequency (typically
quarterly). These devices are generally mechanically interconnected and
it would appear valid to assume some correlation between their failure
rates . The consequences of their failure when required for emergency
use, of course, can be most comparable.
It would seem reasonable for development personnel to approach
such components with an attitude which will investigate the possibility
of critical values n, N such that investigation of overspeed trip
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operability is both periodic (N) and conditional (n) on the
operability of the manual trip. Other non-monitored parts or components
might warrant inclusion in this example. On a turbo-generator, there is
generally an additional safety trip actuated by back pressure which is
not monitored by a PM check. Perhaps it also might possess failure
characteristics to warrant an opportunistic policy (although N may be
in excess of the ship's overhaul cycle).
Operations Research and the Existing 3-M System—Summary
It now appears possible to suggest certain of the theoretical
models of preventive maintenance for useful application within the
existing form and procedures of the 3-M system. Although each of these
policies, which can now be summarized, offer individually unique contri-
butions to the improved management of shipboard maintenance, all provide
the impetus toward the over-riding necessity of integrating 3-M. The
current operation of the 3-M system prohibits a holistic consideration
of system objectives and potentiality. The introduction of Operations
Research methodology, which will both require and facilitate the inte-
gration of the work standardization and information collection sub-systems,
is an excellent means of regaining a total system perspective which will
allow managers to recognize the interdependency of constituent parts.
Many of the tools of Operations Research in the preventive
maintenance area can be directly supplied as additional analytical steps
in the development phase of PMS operation. These models would be
adequately supported for a large segment of the 3-M equipment population
by the existing data available from MDCS . At least the following models
deserve consideration for 3-M application.
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1. Simple Cost-Minimization Model
2. Maximization of Equipment Operating Time
3. Group Replacement Analysis
A. Opportunistic Inspection/Replacement Policies
Operations Research and 3-M System Refinement
For more complete utilization of the theoretical policies
found in the literature, certain changes and additions to current 3-M
operation and technique will be required. Additionally, continuing
research is indicated to determine more precise system objectives,
measurement criteria and methodology, and managerial application for the
products of the System. 3-M is more than simply a management information
system. It is a comprehensive management system capable of strongly
15influencing and improving the process of planning and control. It
contributes to each of the traditional "functions of management":
planning, organization, staffing, directing, and controlling. Improve-
ments in its form and content, including the possible adoption of newer
quantitative techniques from Operations Research, should be examined in
terms of the effects in each of these functional areas. Further, ship-
board 3-M must be recognized as but one of several maintenance management
systems in the Navy. Interface problems with preventive maintenance,
maintenance information systems in naval aviation, nuclear power, special
weapons, etc. must be examined and overall policy coordination provided at
the highest levels. Finally, 3-M must operate successfully with companion
H. S. Oelkers, "Effectiveness of the Navy Maintenance and
Material Management System as a Management Information System,"




management systems within the shipboard area such as financial accounting
systems, inventory control systems, and personnel distribution systems.
Among the system refinements which should be investigated, the
following are considered to be significant:
1. Adoption of a quantifiable definition of the concept of
shipboard material readiness.
2. Development of a standardized methodology for the
measurement of material readiness and the calculation of
an appropriate index.
3. Improvement in the ability to isolate, identify, and
measure the various "costs" of maintenance action,
including specifically:
a. A more precise measure of the costs of maintenance
labor (MDCS currently identifies only the rate/rating
of the senior repairman and the aggregate man-hours
expended)
.
b. Research into techniques which could quantify the
opportunity costs of maintenance actions involving
the diversion of scarce resources. This may imply,
in part, the costing of degradation of material
readiness
.
4. Local (shipboard) identification of the time to failure since
last maintenance (either in calendar or operating time as
appropriate) . While the requirements for shipboard record
keeping and analysis would have prohibited this effort
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when all corrective maintenance actions were reported,
the task should be manageable under the new selected
equipment reporting scheme. When MDCS reporting
accuracy and continuity has improved sufficiently,
this task could, of course, be centralized and accom-
plished by computer. During the initial adoption of
Operations Research modeling, however, the validity of
the failure data characteristics will be the crucial
element in mathematically based decisions and the feedback
to the ships (of new PMS requirements) should probably be
based originally on failure characteristics identified at
the ship level.
5. Continuing study of the MDCS forms and the documentation
effort needed to complete them with the objective of
easing the admistrative burden on shipboard personnel
without excessive sacrifice of timely, accurate, and
usable data.
6. Investigation of maintenance action sampling techniques
which might be used in lieu of a formal reporting require-
ment for certain applications of MDCS.
7. An attempt to construct PMS packages for ships on a systems
vice equipment basis. The managerial notion of the "system"
would be that of the ship itself—requirements, guidance,
and control for planned maintenance would be tailored on
See Appendix D . See also "3-M System Reports Cut Simplifies
Life for Fleet," Navy Times , February 3, 1971, page 5.
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the basis of information concerning each individual
ship's system not on the basis of combining the
"averages" for a ship derived from the total popu-
lation of each equipment.
8. Finally, the planning and development of an expanded
educational program for maintenance managers at all
levels which emphasizes the philosophy behind the 3-M
System. Such a program should be separate from the
functional training now offered in most aspects of 3-M
operation. It would have as one goal the appreciation
of the connection possible from the accumulation of
data at the level to the returned benefits from that





There is a considerable body of literature in the field
of Operations Research which concerns the formulation of optimal
preventive maintenance policies for varying objective criteria.
This base of research, which can be generally classified as a sub-
sidiary topic of Replacement Theory, offers quantitative techniques
to the manager responsible for the operation and maintenance of
equipment which enable him to scientifically determine procedures
which will provide the maximum contribution to selected organiza-
tional objectives. Such objectives are typically related either to
the minimization of the amount of input requirements for equipment
operation (costs) or the maximization of the output products from
such operation or activity (benefits) . Most of the preventive
maintenance models surveyed are additionally based upon the
stochastic characteristics of equipment operation and failure.
Research has, therefore, been extensive in the statistical analysis
of equipment failure data.
The Navy shipboard 3-M System has been employed in the Fleet
for about seven years. It was originally designed as a means to
standardize and simplify preventive maintenance practices for
equipment aboard naval ships. This task has been largely accom-




which employs management engineering techniques of work study, work
simplification, measurement, organizational coordination, and forms
control to foster uniformity of work procedures and managerial control.
Developed shortly after PMS, the MDCS sub-system is a manage-
ment information system designed from a "User Survey" to provide
maintenance and material managers at all levels with the requisite
data and analysis necessary to properly manage the maintenance
function in the fleet operation and support areas of the Department
of the Navy. Together with PMS, MDCS is officially defined as
providing a 3-M system which is integrated in its approach to overall
objectives.
An examination of the interface between the two 3-M sub-systems
reveals only poorly defined and extremely tenuous connection. MDCS,
considered as a separate entity, may be an integrated system for
management information, but the 3-M System is deficient in not
possessing the desired integration of its components. It appears
plausible to attribute this deficiency to two related factors:
a. PMS was developed prior to, and independent of, MDCS<>
b. MDCS was designed on the basis of a user activity
survey which predated the implementation of PMS.
Despite MDCS refinement, PMS has not become a
primary user of MDCS information.
PMS provides preventive maintenance policy and procedural
guidance; MDCS collects and processes maintenance data from those
activities employing PMS. Preventive maintenance models from
Operations Research can provide the bridge to link these currently
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separate functions. The quantitative techniques of the models
provide a means for improved PMS development and refinement through
the feedback of information provided by MDCS. The adoption of such
techniques should contribute toward overall 3-M integration and a
dynamic improvement toward total system objectives.
Although the application of PM models will primarily occur
at the technical bureau level where maintenance requirements are
developed and reviewed, the benefits of 3-M System integration from
such application should become apparent at the lowest maintenance
activity levels. Currently, PMS is a contribution to the maintenance
manager or worker provided by higher echelons. MDCS, however, is an
extraction of time and manpower required for documentation by these
same senior commands. It is not surprising that PMS has enjoyed
fair acceptance and popularity while MDCS has received the bulk of
the criticism from the Fleet. Maintenance personnel do not directly
see the benefits derived from their documentation. An improved piece
of equipment for a new class of ships is a benefit derived from MDCS,
but it is not visible to the maintenance men who provided the source
data. Integration of PMS and MDCS through PM modeling will, however,
provide a visible cause and effect relationship to be apparent at
the lowest levels. Improvements in maintenance practice will be
recognized as a consequence of maintenance documentation. 3-M could
become accepted as a "good" total system, not an undefinable entity
composed of a "good" sub-system and a "bad" sub-system.
Implementation of the basic recommendation to utilize PM




1. Determination of maintenance periodicity for;
a. Preventive Maintenance
b. Preventive Inspection „
2. Group Replacement Policy
3. Opportunistic Inspection/Replacement Policies
The latter two areas appear to afford a relatively easy application
of quantitative techniques in the 3-M System. Periodicity determina-
tion is also relatively easy to recommend when there exists a simple
objective criterion (such as cost minimization or achieving a maximum
proportion of up-time). Where such simple objectives are not
available, however, the direct application of the models to the
existing 3-M System is not possible. In particular, the objectives
of ship and material readiness, addressed by the 3-M System, are not
now quantifiable for model application. As has been indicated,
other research in this area is being pursued by the Navy and will
hopefully lead to broader possibilities for future model application.
This research has not addressed itself to the question of
expenses involved in any possible application of quantitative modeling
for 3-M System operation. Further research to determine current
organizational capabilities and new requirements for the implementa-
tion of these ideas is obviously required. Neither has the present
research discussed or investigated the behavioral questions associated
with the substitution (however complementary) of mathematical for
judgmental techniques in decision making. These factors also merit




Finally, it is hoped that the 3-M Policy Committee, which
is presently conducting an extensive evaluation of the entire 3-M
System for ships, will provide a vehicle for continuing dialogue
on all possible avenues for system improvement and evolution.
Operations Research preventive maintenance theory offers one area
of contribution to this effort.

APPENDIX A
Exhibit 1 - Maintenance Index Page (MIP)
BHPLE
SYSTEM, SUBSYSTCM, OR COMPONENT REFERENCE PUBLICATIONS OATE
May 19f>9
Main Circulating Pump
CONFIGURATION THESE MAINTENANCE REQUIREMENTS ARE APPLICABLE TO EQUIPMENT IN WHICH THE FOLLOWING














65 9658 D 1. Operate turbine casing relief valve by hand. D-l MM3 0.1 None
84 5078 W 1.
2.
3.
Sample and Inspect lube oil.
Lubricate the speed limiting governor.
Turn pump several revolutions by hand,
if steam is available, turn by steam.
V-l MM3 0.5 None





88 Q274 M 1. Inspect packing gland adjustment. M-2 MM3 0.1 None
65 8565 Q 1. Clean sunp and renew oil. Q-l MM3 2.0 None
2. Clean lube oil filter. FN 2.0





84 5082 A 1.
2.
Sound and tighten foundation bolts.
Inspect and clean steam strainer.
A-l MM3 1.0 None
88 Q275 C 1. Inspect Internal water lubricated bearing















84 5085 C 1. Inspect carbon packing for wear. C-3R MM2 3.0 Nona
2. Inspect turbine exterior. FN 3.0
55 4087 C 1. Test turbine casing relief valve on main
circulator.
C-4 MM3 1.0 Nona
88 Q274 R 1. Renew packing when gland has been tightened R-l MM3 1.0 Nona
to within 1/4" of pump housing. . FN 1.0
MAINTENANCE IN0EX PAGE (MIP)
OPNAV 4700-9 (A) (REV. 3/69)
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1. Clean sump and renew oil.









1. Observe standard safety precautions.
2. Wire steam inlet and outlet valves shut and tag "Do Not
Open."
TOOLS, PARTS, MATERIALS, TEST EQUIPMENT
1. 13/16" Combination wrench 7. Wire, 24 gauge
1/2" Drive socket set 8. 6" Slip-joint pliers
Flashlight 9. Oil, Symbol 2190 TEP
4. Lint-free rags 10. 1/32" Gasket material,







a. Wire steam inlet and outlet valves shut and tag "Do
Not Open."
1. Clean Sump and Renew Oil
a. Drain oil sump.
b. Remove inspection plate.
c. Clean out sump.
d. Ensure sump is clear of foreign material.
e. Using new gasket on clean surfaces, reinstall
inspection plate.
f. Fill oil sump with oil.
2. Clean Lube Oil Filter
a. Turn cleaning handle on top of lube oil filter three
or four turns.
b. Remove plug from bottom of filter and drain the
sediment.
c. Reinstall the drain plug.







MAINTENANCE REQUIREMENT CARD (MRC)
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Z-GRAM 46 - REFINEMENT OF SHIPS 3-M MDCS SUB-SYSTEM
1. As part of the continuing effort to reduce the administrative
workload on naval personnel in ships , this NAVOP implements the re-
commendations of the ships 3-M system review group which was appoint-
ed by the CNO to further refine the management information system
and enhance its overall effectiveness.
2. Within the MDCS sub-system, the following refinements are effect-
ive immediately:
A. Equipment identification code reporting will be limited to
those codes listed in the EIC master index manual of 1 Jun 70.
B. Submarines will continue to report maintenance actions in
accordance with the 3-M manual (OPNAV 43P2) as supplemented by fleet
CINCs. The remaining provisions of this program do not apply to
these ships unless specified by fleet CINCs.
C. Maintenance actions performed by ships force will not be
reported except:
(1) On selected equipment as specified for ships in subpara-
graph two delta below.
(2) Essential items for material history in accordance with
uniform instructions of fleet CINC.
(3) As necessary to maintain a simplifed CSMP in accordance
with uniform instructions of fleet CINC.
D. Maintenance actions on selected equipment listed in appendix
eighteen of the 3-M manual will be reported by:
(1) Ships less than twenty years since initial commissioning.
(2) All CLG, CG and other special case ships designated by
fleet CINCs.
E. Maintenance deferred for performance by agencies external to
the ship will continue to be reported by all ships regardless of age.
F. Maintenance deferred for performance by ship's force will
be reported at tycom option and in accordance with guidance to be
published by tycom.
3. A simplified format using the existing OPNAV 4790/2K and a purified
selected equipment list will be implemented in the near future by the
Chief of Naval Material, after coordination with fleet CINCs, to reduce the
MDCS reporting requirements for deferred and completed maintenance actions.
4. Chief of Naval Material and fleet commanders in chief are requested
to provide amplifying instructions to the modified MDCS reporting pro-
cedures outlined above.
5. Commanding officers are requested to give wide dissemination within
their respective commands to the policies contained herein streamlining
MDCS and reducing the administrative workload by approximately forty
percent on ships personnel. A 3-M policy committee has been established
by OPNAVINST 5200.16 (OP-433 Ser 1270P43 of 23 Sep 70 (NOTAL)) to further
review the ship's 3-M system for additional refinements of MDCS and PMS
sub-systems.
6. This NAVOP is cancelled when its provisions have been incorporated in a
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